{"id":6259,"date":"2026-08-11T11:20:32","date_gmt":"2026-08-11T11:20:32","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/arabtradeunion.org\/?post_type=news&p=6259"},"modified":"2026-08-11T11:20:32","modified_gmt":"2026-08-11T11:20:32","slug":"morocco-has-institutionalised-social-dialogue-now-it-faces-the-harder-test-protecting-the-right-to-strike","status":"publish","type":"news","link":"https:\/\/arabtradeunion.org\/ar\/news\/morocco-has-institutionalised-social-dialogue-now-it-faces-the-harder-test-protecting-the-right-to-strike\/","title":{"rendered":"Morocco Has Institutionalised Social Dialogue. Now It Faces the Harder Test: Protecting the Right to Strike"},"content":{"rendered":"

\u0644\u0627 \u064a\u0645\u0643\u0646 \u0642\u0631\u0627\u0621\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u0645\u0634\u0647\u062f \u0627\u0644\u0627\u062c\u062a\u0645\u0627\u0639\u064a \u0641\u064a \u0627\u0644\u0645\u063a\u0631\u0628 \u0627\u0644\u064a\u0648\u0645 \u0628\u0644\u0648\u0646 \u0648\u0627\u062d\u062f. \u0641\u0645\u0646 \u062c\u0647\u0629\u060c \u0627\u0633\u062a\u0637\u0627\u0639 \u0627\u0644\u0628\u0644\u062f \u062e\u0644\u0627\u0644 \u0627\u0644\u0633\u0646\u0648\u0627\u062a \u0627\u0644\u0623\u062e\u064a\u0631\u0629 \u0623\u0646 \u064a\u0631\u0633\u062e \u062d\u0648\u0627\u0631\u0627\u064b \u0627\u062c\u062a\u0645\u0627\u0639\u064a\u0627\u064b \u0623\u0643\u062b\u0631 \u0627\u0646\u062a\u0638\u0627\u0645\u0627\u064b \u0628\u064a\u0646 \u0627\u0644\u062d\u0643\u0648\u0645\u0629 \u0648\u0627\u0644\u0645\u0631\u0643\u0632\u064a\u0627\u062a \u0627\u0644\u0646\u0642\u0627\u0628\u064a\u0629 \u0648\u0623\u0631\u0628\u0627\u0628 \u0627\u0644\u0639\u0645\u0644\u060c \u0648\u0623\u0646 \u064a\u062d\u0648\u0644 \u062c\u0632\u0621\u0627\u064b \u0645\u0646 \u0647\u0630\u0627 \u0627\u0644\u062d\u0648\u0627\u0631 \u0625\u0644\u0649 \u0645\u0643\u0627\u0633\u0628 \u0645\u0644\u0645\u0648\u0633\u0629 \u0641\u064a \u0627\u0644\u0623\u062c\u0648\u0631 \u0648\u0627\u0644\u0636\u0631\u064a\u0628\u0629 \u0639\u0644\u0649 \u0627\u0644\u062f\u062e\u0644 \u0648\u0627\u0644\u062d\u062f \u0627\u0644\u0623\u062f\u0646\u0649 \u0644\u0644\u0623\u062c\u0631. \u0648\u0645\u0646 \u062c\u0647\u0629 \u0623\u062e\u0631\u0649\u060c \u0644\u0627 \u062a\u0632\u0627\u0644 \u0642\u0637\u0627\u0639\u0627\u062a \u0645\u0646 \u0627\u0644\u062d\u0631\u0643\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u0646\u0642\u0627\u0628\u064a\u0629 \u062a\u0639\u0648\u062f \u0625\u0644\u0649 \u0627\u0644\u0627\u062d\u062a\u062c\u0627\u062c \u0648\u0627\u0644\u0634\u0627\u0631\u0639\u060c \u0641\u064a\u0645\u0627 \u062a\u062d\u0648\u0644 \u0627\u0644\u0642\u0627\u0646\u0648\u0646 \u0627\u0644\u062a\u0646\u0638\u064a\u0645\u064a \u0627\u0644\u0645\u062a\u0639\u0644\u0642 \u0628\u0645\u0645\u0627\u0631\u0633\u0629 \u062d\u0642 \u0627\u0644\u0625\u0636\u0631\u0627\u0628 \u0625\u0644\u0649 \u0648\u0627\u062d\u062f\u0629 \u0645\u0646 \u0623\u0643\u062b\u0631 \u0627\u0644\u0642\u0636\u0627\u064a\u0627 \u0625\u062b\u0627\u0631\u0629 \u0644\u0644\u062e\u0644\u0627\u0641 \u0628\u064a\u0646 \u0627\u0644\u062d\u0643\u0648\u0645\u0629 \u0648\u0627\u0644\u0646\u0642\u0627\u0628\u0627\u062a.
\nOpinion | Arab Trade Union Confederation
\nThere is a temptation, when looking at labour relations in Morocco today, to tell one of two competing stories.
\n\u0644\u0627 \u064a\u0645\u0643\u0646 \u0642\u0631\u0627\u0621\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u0645\u0634\u0647\u062f \u0627\u0644\u0627\u062c\u062a\u0645\u0627\u0639\u064a \u0641\u064a \u0627\u0644\u0645\u063a\u0631\u0628 \u0627\u0644\u064a\u0648\u0645 \u0628\u0644\u0648\u0646 \u0648\u0627\u062d\u062f. \u0641\u0645\u0646 \u062c\u0647\u0629\u060c \u0627\u0633\u062a\u0637\u0627\u0639 \u0627\u0644\u0628\u0644\u062f \u062e\u0644\u0627\u0644 \u0627\u0644\u0633\u0646\u0648\u0627\u062a \u0627\u0644\u0623\u062e\u064a\u0631\u0629 \u0623\u0646 \u064a\u0631\u0633\u062e \u062d\u0648\u0627\u0631\u0627\u064b \u0627\u062c\u062a\u0645\u0627\u0639\u064a\u0627\u064b \u0623\u0643\u062b\u0631 \u0627\u0646\u062a\u0638\u0627\u0645\u0627\u064b \u0628\u064a\u0646 \u0627\u0644\u062d\u0643\u0648\u0645\u0629 \u0648\u0627\u0644\u0645\u0631\u0643\u0632\u064a\u0627\u062a \u0627\u0644\u0646\u0642\u0627\u0628\u064a\u0629 \u0648\u0623\u0631\u0628\u0627\u0628 \u0627\u0644\u0639\u0645\u0644\u060c \u0648\u0623\u0646 \u064a\u062d\u0648\u0644 \u062c\u0632\u0621\u0627\u064b \u0645\u0646 \u0647\u0630\u0627 \u0627\u0644\u062d\u0648\u0627\u0631 \u0625\u0644\u0649 \u0645\u0643\u0627\u0633\u0628 \u0645\u0644\u0645\u0648\u0633\u0629 \u0641\u064a \u0627\u0644\u0623\u062c\u0648\u0631 \u0648\u0627\u0644\u0636\u0631\u064a\u0628\u0629 \u0639\u0644\u0649 \u0627\u0644\u062f\u062e\u0644 \u0648\u0627\u0644\u062d\u062f \u0627\u0644\u0623\u062f\u0646\u0649 \u0644\u0644\u0623\u062c\u0631. \u0648\u0645\u0646 \u062c\u0647\u0629 \u0623\u062e\u0631\u0649\u060c \u0644\u0627 \u062a\u0632\u0627\u0644 \u0642\u0637\u0627\u0639\u0627\u062a \u0645\u0646 \u0627\u0644\u062d\u0631\u0643\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u0646\u0642\u0627\u0628\u064a\u0629 \u062a\u0639\u0648\u062f \u0625\u0644\u0649 \u0627\u0644\u0627\u062d\u062a\u062c\u0627\u062c \u0648\u0627\u0644\u0634\u0627\u0631\u0639\u060c \u0641\u064a\u0645\u0627 \u062a\u062d\u0648\u0644 \u0627\u0644\u0642\u0627\u0646\u0648\u0646 \u0627\u0644\u062a\u0646\u0638\u064a\u0645\u064a \u0627\u0644\u0645\u062a\u0639\u0644\u0642 \u0628\u0645\u0645\u0627\u0631\u0633\u0629 \u062d\u0642 \u0627\u0644\u0625\u0636\u0631\u0627\u0628 \u0625\u0644\u0649 \u0648\u0627\u062d\u062f\u0629 \u0645\u0646 \u0623\u0643\u062b\u0631 \u0627\u0644\u0642\u0636\u0627\u064a\u0627 \u0625\u062b\u0627\u0631\u0629 \u0644\u0644\u062e\u0644\u0627\u0641 \u0628\u064a\u0646 \u0627\u0644\u062d\u0643\u0648\u0645\u0629 \u0648\u0627\u0644\u0646\u0642\u0627\u0628\u0627\u062a.
\nThe second story is one of discontent. Trade unions continue to mobilise in the streets, purchasing power remains a central concern for working families, unemployment is stubbornly high, and Organic Law No. 97.15 regulating the right to strike has become one of the most contentious pieces of social legislation in the country in years.
\nBoth stories are true, and understanding modern Morocco requires holding them together.
\nThe central problem is no longer the absence of social dialogue. Morocco has dialogue, institutions, and recognised national trade union centres capable of negotiating with the government and employers. The more difficult question is what that dialogue can actually deliver and what happens when it fails:
\nCan it protect purchasing power rather than merely repair it after inflation has already eroded wages?
\nCan workers influence major social and economic reforms before decisions are taken?
\nCan collective bargaining reach more workplaces and sectors?
\nAnd, ultimately, when negotiations reach an impasse, can workers still withdraw their labour in a way that exerts meaningful collective pressure?
\nThat last question has acquired new significance after the International Court of Justice\u2019s advisory opinion on the right to strike. It is also why a debate that might appear narrowly legal over the procedures governing industrial action is in fact a debate about the future balance of power in Morocco\u2019s emerging social model.
\nAn Economy Creating Jobs \u2013 But Not Enough of Them
\nMorocco enters this debate at a moment of considerable economic ambition. Major investments in manufacturing, renewable energy, automotive production, aviation, infrastructure, and logistics are transforming parts of the economy, strengthening its place in international supply chains, and preparing for another cycle of infrastructure investment ahead of the 2030 FIFA World Cup.
\nYet the labour market tells a more complicated story. According to the High Commission for Planning, Morocco created 193,000 jobs in 2025:
\nServices accounted for 123,000 new jobs.
\nConstruction and public works accounted for 64,000.
\nIndustry accounted for 46,000.
\nAgriculture, forestry, and fishing, however, lost 41,000 jobs.
\nOverall unemployment declined only slightly, from 13.3% in 2024 to 13% in 2025, leaving approximately 1.62 million people unemployed. Behind that headline figure lie much sharper inequalities:
\nUnemployment among people aged 15 to 24 reached 37.2%.
\nAmong women, it rose to 20.5%.
\nAmong graduates, it stood at 19.1%.
\nUnderemployment moved in the opposite direction to headline unemployment, rising from 10.1% to 10.9% and affecting about 1.19 million people.
\nThese figures complicate any easy narrative of economic success. Morocco is creating jobs, but it is not yet creating enough secure, productive, and adequately paid work to absorb its young population or close the gaps affecting women and graduates. And that is precisely why the institutions governing wages, bargaining, and workers\u2019 collective voice matter.
\nInflation May Fall. Prices Do Not.
\nInflation has eased markedly from the shocks experienced earlier in the decade, which is welcome news. But for workers, falling inflation is easily misunderstood.
\nLower inflation does not mean that food, housing, transport, and other essentials have returned to their previous prices; it means that those prices are increasing more slowly. For a working household whose living costs rose substantially over several years, the relevant question is not simply the latest inflation rate, but how much purchasing power the wage has lost and how much of it has been recovered.
\nThis is where Morocco\u2019s social dialogue has produced results that should not be dismissed. The agreement reached on April 29, 2024, between the government and social partners provided for a net general monthly increase of 1,000 Moroccan dirhams for eligible public-sector employees, delivered in two instalments. It also included income-tax reform and a 10% increase in the statutory minimum wage, implemented in two stages.
\nBy 2026, the second phase had taken effect:
\nFrom January, the statutory minimum wage for non-agricultural activities rose to 17.92 dirhams an hour.
\nFrom April, the agricultural minimum reached 97.44 dirhams for a working day.
\nThese are not symbolic concessions. They demonstrate something important in a region where meaningful tripartite bargaining remains far from universal: when political will and representative negotiation coincide, social dialogue can put money directly into workers\u2019 pockets.
\nThat achievement should be recognised, but its success creates the next question: Should social dialogue remain primarily a mechanism for negotiating periodic wage adjustments after purchasing power has deteriorated, or can it become something more ambitious a permanent institution through which workers and employers participate in shaping social and economic policy?
\nBeyond the Question of \u201cHow Much?\u201d
\nMorocco\u2019s next phase of social dialogue cannot be reduced indefinitely to a negotiation over the size of the next pay increase. Minimum wages matter enormously, but a statutory wage floor cannot by itself repair all the structural weaknesses of a labour market:
\nIt cannot solve youth unemployment.
\nIt cannot automatically extend collective bargaining to workers who have little bargaining coverage.
\nIt cannot formalise the informal economy.
\nIt cannot by itself solve the unequal economic participation of women.
\nNor can it answer the politically difficult questions surrounding pensions, social protection, technological change, and the future distribution of productivity gains.
\nThe more mature social dialogue becomes, the more it must move from asking \u201chow large will the increase be?\u201d to asking \u201cwhat kind of labour market are we building?\u201d And it is at precisely this point that Morocco\u2019s dispute over the right to strike becomes so important.
\nA Right Guaranteed for Decades and Regulated After Decades of Delay
\nOrganic Law No. 97.15, setting out the conditions and procedures for exercising the right to strike, has become the focal point of much of the current tension between Morocco\u2019s government and trade unions.
\nThe history matters. Regulating strikes was not an invention of the current government. Morocco\u2019s constitution guarantees the right to strike while providing for an organic law governing how it is exercised. For more than six decades, that legislation remained unfinished. Ending such a long legal vacuum was therefore a legitimate institutional objective, because fundamental rights need protection, and legal certainty matters. Workers, unions, employers, and public authorities all benefit from knowing the rules governing industrial action.
\nNor was the final law simply a first draft imposed unchanged on organised labour. It went through years of negotiation, political argument, and amendment. When the House of Councillors considered the legislation in February 2025, 247 amendments had been submitted, including government amendments:
\nThe Moroccan Labour Union (UMT) submitted 42.
\nThe Democratic Confederation of Labour (CDT) submitted 33.
\nThe General Union of Moroccan Workers (UGTM) submitted 30.
\nThe final vote was 41 in favour and seven against, while UMT representatives withdrew in protest. So the central disagreement was never simply whether strikes should be regulated; the real dispute was and remains when regulation becomes restriction.
\nWhen Does Procedure Weaken Power?
\nThe law recognises the right to strike and establishes protections around its exercise. But it also specifies who may call a strike, creates procedures and notice periods, regulates the continuation of certain services, and protects the ability of non-striking employees to work. It also imposes rules relating to access to workplaces, their occupation, and interference with the movement of people, equipment, and goods.
\nTaken separately, many such provisions can be found in industrial-relations systems elsewhere. The trade union concern lies in their cumulative effect.
\nA strike is unlike most other rights because timing is part of its power. A demonstration postponed by a week remains a demonstration. A strike postponed through procedures until the moment at which it can exert economic or negotiating pressure has passed may be a very different thing.
\nThe legal question therefore cannot be merely whether workers remain theoretically able to strike. It must also ask whether the procedures, notice requirements, restrictions, and sanctions surrounding industrial action leave workers with a right that can still be exercised effectively. That distinction between regulating a right and hollowing it out lies at the centre of international labour standards.
\nThen Came The Hague
\nThat debate changed significantly on May 21, 2026, when the International Court of Justice delivered its advisory opinion on the right to strike, following a long-running dispute within the International Labour Organization over the interpretation of Convention No. 87 on freedom of association.
\nThe significance of the court\u2019s intervention extends far beyond Geneva. The dispute concerned one of the foundational questions of international labour law: whether the protection of freedom of association under Convention 87 encompasses a right to strike. The court\u2019s conclusion strengthened the legal foundation for treating strike action as connected to the protection provided by Convention 87. For trade unions internationally, the opinion is consequential because it reinforces an idea they have defended for decades: collective organisation without an effective ability to withdraw labour risks becoming freedom without leverage.
\nIn Morocco, however, the implications require precision. Morocco has not ratified Convention No. 87. It would therefore be legally careless to claim that the ICJ opinion automatically makes Organic Law 97.15 a violation of Morocco\u2019s treaty obligations under that convention. It does not.
\nBut that is not the end of the matter. Morocco has been a member of the ILO since 1956, ratified Convention No. 98 on the right to organise and collective bargaining in 1957, and has also ratified Convention No. 144 on tripartite consultation and Convention No. 154 on collective bargaining. Freedom of association also forms part of the ILO\u2019s fundamental principles and rights at work.
\nThe ICJ opinion therefore carries considerable normative and political weight for a country that seeks closer alignment with international labour standards and presents social dialogue as a pillar of its social model. The issue is not whether The Hague has suddenly rewritten Moroccan legislation; it has not. The issue is whether the international benchmark against which strike regulation is debated has moved. It has.
\nMorocco\u2019s Unions Did Not React in the Same Way Nor Should They Have To
\nMorocco\u2019s trade unions responded to these developments through distinct strategies:
\nThe UMT seized on the international development. Having submitted numerous amendments and withdrawn from the final vote in protest, it renewed its challenge to Law 97.15 after the ICJ opinion, calling for its implementation to be suspended and the debate reopened in light of the new international legal context.
\nThe CDT maintained a critical position while consistently situating the strike law within a broader social struggle over wages, purchasing power, pensions, and trade union freedoms a connection visible in national mobilisations like the march in Casablanca at the end of June.
\nThe UGTM pursued a strategy more closely anchored in negotiation and institutional amendment, submitting 30 amendments during the parliamentary process and remaining actively engaged in social dialogue.
\nThese differences should not be reduced to a simplistic division between unions that defend the right to strike and those that do not. They reflect different trade union strategies: pressure from outside institutions, negotiation from within them, or different combinations of both. That diversity is not a weakness; a plural trade union movement does not need a single political voice, but rather the freedom and institutional capacity to represent workers through the strategies their members choose.
\nThe Government Has a Case Too
\nAny serious assessment must also acknowledge the government\u2019s argument. Morocco\u2019s social dialogue has delivered measurable outcomes: public-sector workers received wage increases, minimum wages increased across sectors, and income-tax reform improved take-home pay for parts of the workforce.
\nThe government can reasonably argue that Law 97.15 ended a legislative vacuum lasting generations, that the legislation was extensively amended during negotiations and parliamentary scrutiny, and that protecting strikers cannot mean ignoring the rights of non-strikers or society\u2019s need for genuinely essential services to continue.
\nThose arguments should not be caricatured. International labour standards themselves do not treat the right to strike as unlimited: reasonable prior procedures can be compatible with the right, and restrictions can be justified in essential services in the strict sense where interruption would endanger the life, personal safety, or health of the population.
\nYet acknowledging the government\u2019s case produces an equally legitimate question: If Morocco\u2019s social dialogue is now more regular, institutionalised, and capable of producing real gains, why does a significant part of organised labour still believe it must return to the streets, and why has a law intended to give legal form to a constitutional right generated such profound distrust?
\nThe answer may lie not in the failure of Morocco\u2019s social-dialogue model, but in its evolution.
\nMorocco Has Reached the Difficult Stage of Social Dialogue
\nIn many parts of the Arab region, trade unions are still fighting a more elementary battle: recognition of trade union pluralism, the ability to organise independently, or simply persuading governments to engage in regular dialogue. Morocco is further down that road, having established trade union centres, institutions, and collective bargaining experience. Social dialogue is embedded in political and economic life to a degree that remains unusual in much of the region.
\nThat changes the nature of the challenge. The question is no longer simply whether dialogue exists, but whether workers have enough influence within it.
\nThe next stage is moving from regular meetings to meaningful participation in decisions, from minimum-wage increases to wider collective bargaining coverage, and from recognising the right to strike on paper to ensuring workers can exercise it in practice. After the ICJ advisory opinion, Morocco has an opportunity to consider a step that would carry significance well beyond this particular dispute.
\nWhy Not Convention 87?
\nMorocco has ratified eight of the ILO\u2019s 10 fundamental conventions, but Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise remains one of the two fundamental conventions it has not ratified.
\nAfter the ICJ opinion, opening a serious national discussion on ratification would be a logical next step. It would not simply add another international instrument to Morocco\u2019s commitments; it would send a much broader signal. A country that has invested in institutionalising social dialogue, expanding social protection, developing collective bargaining, and modernising labour legislation would be demonstrating that it is prepared to match those reforms with the fullest international commitment to freedom of association.
\nRatification would not eliminate industrial conflict, nor should that be the objective. Mature industrial-relations systems are not those in which disagreement disappears, but those in which workers, employers, and governments possess legitimate institutions through which disagreement can be negotiated, contested, and resolved. That is the opportunity now facing Morocco.
\nThe Right to Strike Is Ultimately About the Right to Negotiate
\nThere is a deeper reason why the strike debate matters. The value of a strike does not lie primarily in workers stopping work; its value lies in the possibility that they can.
\nCollective bargaining takes place between parties with interests that do not always coincide: employers possess economic power, governments possess regulatory power, and workers possess their labour and, collectively, the possibility of withholding it. Remove that possibility entirely, and the character of negotiation changes.
\nThis is why the right to strike should not be understood as the opposite of social dialogue. Properly protected, it is one of the conditions that can make social dialogue meaningful. The objective of successful labour relations is not to maximise strikes, but to create institutions strong enough that strikes are often unnecessary while preserving workers\u2019 credible ability to use them when negotiation fails.
\nMorocco has already built much of the institutional architecture required for such a model. Its next challenge is to build trust in that architecture:
\nIt requires the government to recognise that criticism of the strike law is not necessarily rejection of regulation itself.
\nIt requires unions to engage seriously with the legitimate rights of non-strikers and the continuity of genuinely essential services.
\nIt requires all sides to accept that social dialogue is strongest when none of them enters the room powerless.
\nFrom Social Dialogue to Social Democracy
\nMorocco has a genuine opportunity to build one of the Arab region\u2019s most advanced systems of social dialogue not because it is free of conflict, but precisely because it has institutions capable of managing conflict.
\nThe achievements of recent years should be treated as foundations rather than conclusions. Wage increases matter, higher minimum wages matter, tax reform matters, and regular tripartite dialogue matters. But the next stage requires something more ambitious: moving from institutional dialogue towards deeper social democracy, from periodic wage correction towards a coherent wages policy, from limited bargaining towards broader collective bargaining, and from regulating strike action towards ensuring that regulation does not deprive it of its essential force.
\nRatification of ILO Convention 87 would be a powerful part of that journey.
\nThe ICJ\u2019s opinion has not invalidated Morocco\u2019s strike law, nor has it settled every argument between the government and unions. What it has done is make one proposition considerably harder to ignore: The ability of workers to act collectively, including through strike action, belongs at the heart of any serious system of freedom of association.
\nFor Morocco, that should not be seen as a threat to the social dialogue it has painstakingly constructed, but as an opportunity to strengthen it. Because a social state cannot be measured only by what it spends on social protection or by the number of dirhams added to a minimum wage; it must also be measured by whether the people whose lives are shaped by economic decisions have enough collective power to help shape those decisions themselves.
\nThat is the unfinished business of Morocco\u2019s social dialogue.<\/p>","protected":false},"featured_media":6248,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"template":"","meta":{"_acf_changed":false},"country":[589],"news-categories":[],"news-tags":[],"sectors":[],"types-of-trade-union-violations":[],"worker-categories-most-affected":[],"class_list":["post-6259","news","type-news","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","country-morocco"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/arabtradeunion.org\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/news\/6259","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/arabtradeunion.org\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/news"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/arabtradeunion.org\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/news"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/arabtradeunion.org\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/news\/6259\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6260,"href":"https:\/\/arabtradeunion.org\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/news\/6259\/revisions\/6260"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arabtradeunion.org\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/6248"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/arabtradeunion.org\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6259"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"country","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arabtradeunion.org\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/country?post=6259"},{"taxonomy":"news-categories","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arabtradeunion.org\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/news-categories?post=6259"},{"taxonomy":"news-tags","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arabtradeunion.org\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/news-tags?post=6259"},{"taxonomy":"sectors","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arabtradeunion.org\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/sectors?post=6259"},{"taxonomy":"types-of-trade-union-violations","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arabtradeunion.org\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types-of-trade-union-violations?post=6259"},{"taxonomy":"worker-categories-most-affected","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arabtradeunion.org\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/worker-categories-most-affected?post=6259"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}