{"id":6265,"date":"2026-08-15T15:26:04","date_gmt":"2026-08-15T15:26:04","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/arabtradeunion.org\/?post_type=news&p=6265"},"modified":"2026-08-15T15:26:04","modified_gmt":"2026-08-15T15:26:04","slug":"the-cnapeste-case-and-the-test-of-trade-union-freedom-in-algeria-dissolving-unions-does-not-solve-social-crises","status":"publish","type":"news","link":"https:\/\/arabtradeunion.org\/ar\/news\/the-cnapeste-case-and-the-test-of-trade-union-freedom-in-algeria-dissolving-unions-does-not-solve-social-crises\/","title":{"rendered":"\u0642\u0636\u064a\u0629 CNAPESTE \u0648\u0627\u062e\u062a\u0628\u0627\u0631 \u0627\u0644\u062d\u0631\u064a\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u0646\u0642\u0627\u0628\u064a\u0629 \u0641\u064a \u0627\u0644\u062c\u0632\u0627\u0626\u0631\n\u062d\u0644\u0651 \u0627\u0644\u0646\u0642\u0627\u0628\u0627\u062a \u0644\u0627 \u064a\u062d\u0644\u0651 \u0627\u0644\u0623\u0632\u0645\u0627\u062a \u0627\u0644\u0627\u062c\u062a\u0645\u0627\u0639\u064a\u0629"},"content":{"rendered":"

Some decisions carry consequences that ripple far beyond the immediate parties involved, raising fundamental questions about the relationship between the state, society, and institutions of social mediation. It is in this light that we must view the ruling by the Algiers Administrative Court to dissolve the independent National Council of Teachers for the Three-Tier Education Sector, widely known as CNAPESTE.
\r\nRegardless of the legal arguments surrounding the case, and regardless of the prior disputes between the union and public authorities, dissolving an established trade union organisation cannot be treated as a mere administrative procedure or the routine close of a legal dispute. It is a decision that strikes at one of the primary institutions through which workers have chosen to organise themselves and represent their interests. Consequently, its impact extends well beyond CNAPESTE and its members, touching off a much broader debate on trade union freedom, pluralism, and the future of social dialogue in Algeria.
\r\nFrom the outset, this discussion must not be reduced to a simplistic confrontation between defenders of the state and defenders of the union. The state holds the responsibility of upholding the law and ensuring the orderly functioning of public institutions and services. Similarly, trade unions like any other societal institutions\u2014are not above the law; they are required to respect internal democratic rules, transparency, legal obligations, and their responsibilities toward their members and society.
\r\nYet this reality does not close the debate. Instead, it opens it up to a more fundamental question: When dealing with a fundamental right such as trade union freedom, is it enough for a measure to rest on a provision of national law, or must it also be proven necessary, proportionate, and aligned with the international commitments the state has freely undertaken?
\r\nFor Algeria, this question carries special weight. Algeria is a state party to International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. 87 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise. The obligation under this treaty is not confined to permitting workers to establish organisations that bear legal names and formal status; it extends to protecting the independence of these organisations, safeguarding their right to elect representatives, manage their own affairs, formulate their programmes, and carry out their activities free from unwarranted interference by public authorities.
\r\nHistorically, ILO standards have treated the dissolution of trade union organisations as one of the gravest threats to trade union freedom. This is because the impact falls not merely on an organisation\u2019s legal framework, but directly on the right of workers to maintain the specific organisation they have chosen to represent them.
\r\nBeyond Legalism: When Regulation Becomes Restriction
\r\nEvaluating the CNAPESTE case cannot be limited to examining whether Law No. 23-02 on the exercise of trade union rights provides a legal basis for taking certain actions against a union. The deeper question is whether resorting to dissolution the most extreme penalty affecting the very existence of an organisation is a necessary and proportionate response to the alleged violations, and whether all less restrictive avenues were exhausted before reaching this stage.
\r\nIn social conflicts, there is always space for dialogue, negotiation, mediation, conciliation, legal compliance, judicial recourse, and proportionate sanctions when infractions are proven. Terminating an organization\u2019s legal existence, however, must remain an absolute last resort, because the fine line between regulating the exercise of a right and undermining its very core becomes razor-thin at that point.
\r\nThis principle is vital because the greatest danger in dissolving a union does not concern the targeted organisation alone; it lies in the precedent it sets across the entire trade union landscape. When a union official or a worker sees that a sharp dispute with management can ultimately end in the destruction of their organisation\u2019s existence, the psychological impact spreads automatically to how other organisations exercise their rights.
\r\nUnions may begin practicing self-censorship in their stances and actions not because they are convinced their demands should change, but out of fear of meeting the same fate. Pluralism may survive on paper while shrinking drastically in practice. This makes the guarantees of trade union freedom far larger than the mere count of registered organisations: the critical test is the degree to which these organisations can function effectively when they disagree with authority.
\r\nConflict Is Not a Flaw in the Relationship
\r\nDisagreement, in and of itself, is not a malfunction in the relationship between the state and trade unions. It is a natural part of it.
\r\nUnions were not created to serve as mere extensions of the administration, nor were they established to maintain permanent confrontation with it. Their core function is to represent workers, defend their interests, negotiate working conditions, and voice dissent when their base concludes that government policies infringe upon their rights or social standing.
\r\nConsequently, a union may oppose a government reform, criticize legislation, enter into difficult negotiations over wages or working conditions, or resort to protests and strikes within the bounds of laws consistent with international standards. The presence of such tension does not signify the failure of social dialogue; rather, the capacity of institutions to manage that tension without obliterating any of the parties involved is one of the clearest indicators of mature social dialogue.
\r\nThis makes the current climate in Algeria particularly sensitive. Like most countries in the region, Algeria faces profound economic and social transformations concerning purchasing power, wages, public employment, social protection, youth unemployment, and the structural shifts driven by the digital economy and artificial intelligence. These files will only grow more complex in the coming years, requiring decisions and reforms that may be difficult and socially costly.
\r\nUnder such conditions, strong unions are sometimes viewed as obstacles to the speed of reform. Yet experience proves the opposite: the presence of legitimate social partners equipped with genuine negotiating capacity is often one of the most critical elements for ensuring that reforms actually succeed.
\r\nA union that commands the trust of its members does more than simply transmit demands; it organizes them, translates them into a coherent negotiating agenda, takes responsibility for the agreements it signs, and helps contain disputes before they explode into open social crises. Weakening the trade union intermediary may produce a temporary quiet, but it does not resolve the underlying economic and social drivers of protest. Silence in social relations is not always a sign of stability; frequently, it is a symptom that the channels through which workers are supposed to express their grievances have broken down.
\r\nHistorical Memory and the Search for Balance
\r\nIn Algeria specifically, this debate is inseparable from the nation\u2019s political and social history. The labor and trade union movement was never a peripheral element of the Algerian experience; its history is deeply entwined with the national liberation struggle, state-building, and the defense of social justice.
\r\nThis legacy grants Algeria both an opportunity and a responsibility: to build a model demonstrating that state strength and trade union strength are not mutually exclusive projects. A strong state does not require a weak trade union movement. What both sides need is a clear institutional framework that accommodates disagreement, protects the independence of each party, and makes dialogue and negotiation the natural path for resolving disputes.
\r\nTherefore, the CNAPESTE case must not be reduced to a zero-sum game where one party\u2019s victory is conditional upon another\u2019s defeat. The objective is neither to exempt unions from legal accountability nor to question the state\u2019s right to regulate professional relations. Rather, it is to ensure that the organizations concerned enjoy full guarantees of defense and effective judicial appeal, and that national legislation is applied in light of Algeria\u2019s international commitments above all, ILO Convention No. 87.
\r\nFurthermore, this case serves as an opportunity to open a broader review of Law No. 23-02 and its practical implementation. Legislation is measured not only by the intentions behind its enactment, but by the concrete results it produces in practice. If experience shows that certain provisions or enforcement methods create a climate of legal uncertainty for trade unions regarding the boundaries of legitimate activity, it is in the shared interest of both the state and the labor movement to revise these areas through institutional social dialogue.
\r\nThe goal should not be to weaken state authority or grant unions immunity from accountability, but to strike a balance that safeguards public order while preserving the core essence of trade union freedom.
\r\nBringing Law No. 23-02 back to the negotiating table is essential to eliminate bureaucratic hurdles and harsh punitive clauses. The pretext of curbing \u201cphantom unions\u201d and ensuring proper trade union representation must never be turned into a gateway for dismantling the labor movement. The legislature already had the mechanism to achieve order through trade union elections to identify the most representative organizations thus avoiding the complexities introduced by the law while guaranteeing a democratic, representative labor landscape.
\r\nA Regional Dimension
\r\nThis issue also transcends Algeria\u2019s borders. Trade union freedom in the Arab region is navigating a delicate phase, even as specific challenges vary from country to country. In some nations, the formation of union organizations still faces severe restrictions; in others, debates center around trade union pluralism, collective bargaining, and the right to strike, compounded in recent years by digital-era laws and new administrative and judicial constraints.
\r\nConsequently, every development affecting workers\u2019 ability to organize in one Arab country carries resonance for the labor movement across the wider region just as every advance in protecting trade union freedom raises the regional ceiling for potential rights.
\r\nIt is from this perspective that the Arab Trade Union Confederation\u2019s focus on the CNAPESTE case stems from its commitment to trade union freedom as a right enshrined in international standards accepted by states themselves. Cross-border solidarity among workers and their organizations is an intrinsic part of the international labor movement\u2019s DNA. The duty of a regional labor organization is to defend these principles with the same vigor that it respects national institutions and the legal sovereignty of states.
\r\nWhat the current phase demands is not escalation, but the restoration of trust. This requires guaranteeing CNAPESTE\u2019s right to utilize all available legal remedies, respecting judicial independence, and simultaneously seeking avenues to restart dialogue between public authorities and the various components of Algeria\u2019s labor movement. Social dialogue is neither a concession handed down by the state to unions nor an entitlement granted by unions to the government; it is an indispensable institution for managing modern society especially when interests clash and economic and social choices are difficult.
\r\nUltimately, the CNAPESTE case will run its legal course, and the appellate stages may bring new developments. Yet the case has already left behind a question that must not be lost in legal technicalities: How do we uphold the rule of law without allowing the rules governing trade union freedom to become restrictions that hollow it out?
\r\nThe answer does not lie in exempting unions from the law, nor in weakening the state\u2019s capacity to enforce it. It lies in building a balance that ensures a worker can freely choose their representative, that a union remains free to disagree, negotiate, and protest within the framework of the law, and that the state remains capable of managing those differences without threatening the very existence of the workers\u2019 organizations themselves.<\/p>","protected":false},"featured_media":6262,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"template":"","meta":{"_acf_changed":false},"country":[573],"news-categories":[],"news-tags":[],"sectors":[],"types-of-trade-union-violations":[],"worker-categories-most-affected":[],"class_list":["post-6265","news","type-news","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","country-algeria"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/arabtradeunion.org\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/news\/6265","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/arabtradeunion.org\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/news"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/arabtradeunion.org\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/news"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/arabtradeunion.org\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/news\/6265\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6266,"href":"https:\/\/arabtradeunion.org\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/news\/6265\/revisions\/6266"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arabtradeunion.org\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/6262"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/arabtradeunion.org\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6265"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"country","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arabtradeunion.org\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/country?post=6265"},{"taxonomy":"news-categories","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arabtradeunion.org\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/news-categories?post=6265"},{"taxonomy":"news-tags","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arabtradeunion.org\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/news-tags?post=6265"},{"taxonomy":"sectors","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arabtradeunion.org\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/sectors?post=6265"},{"taxonomy":"types-of-trade-union-violations","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arabtradeunion.org\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types-of-trade-union-violations?post=6265"},{"taxonomy":"worker-categories-most-affected","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arabtradeunion.org\/ar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/worker-categories-most-affected?post=6265"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}